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Abstract 
Introduction 
The triple helix model considers the university-industry-government relationships as one of 
relatively equal and interdependent institutional spheres, which can overlap and take the roles 
of the others (e.g. Etzkowitz 2002 and 2008). In this research, we illustrate the case of 
universities taking the role of governments in the area of enterprise innovation. We argue that 
universities should play the role of implementing policies and use discretion to some extent 
according to the programmes’ scope of action, which was contractually agreed with the policy 
administrators. However, in 5 of the 6 case studies of this research we found excessive 
discretion and the consequent change of the role of the university personnel from policy-
implementers to policy-makers. Importantly, our assessment of the public interventions was very 
negative, which highlights the relevance of the research. We explain the reasons for the 
excessive discretion.  
State of the Art about the Topic 
To our knowledge, there is no research about universities taking the role of governments. In 
contrast, in the areas of public administration and political sciences, there is a long-standing 
debate between two positions regarding discretion and the effect of this on policy-making. 
Firstly, we have the view from those who argue that discretion exists at street-level (e.g. Lipsky 
1980, Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, Ellis et al. 1999, and Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
2003). In this situation, policies tend to be made as much from the street-level by policy 
implementers, as from the heads of policy agencies. The second position regarding discretion is 
from those who propose that there has been a shift in power in favour of policy-makers as a 
consequence of the centralisation of strategic political direction and the introduction of 
competition in the delivery of public services. (e.g. Howe 1991, Clarke and Newman 1997, and 
Langan 2000). 
Research Focus and Methodology 
We developed 6 case studies of public programme assistance to information systems (IS) 
innovation initiatives in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), in order to uncover and illustrate 
the existence of discretion at programme level. After that, we analysed the context of the cases 
in terms of the complex procedures and behaviours in the policy process, which are determinant 
for the practice of discretion at street level. The policy process includes policy-making, policy 
administration, and programme implementation.  
Findings 
Policy-makers are pressured to show the delivery of a high quantity of services but being very 
efficient in the use of resources, which diverted the auditing and control indicators and 
procedures to address these political imperatives, and not the quality and content of the 
services. In addition, the policy administrators that performed the auditing and control activities 
were mere contract managers, who do not know about technology and business. What is more, 
their organisations took relevant roles in designing the public policies or had connection to the 
organisations that delivered the programmes, which creates a conflict of interests. Another 
relevant finding is that policy-makers used extensive and ambiguous policies, probably as a 
strategy to distance themselves from the consequences of the particular and complicated 
decisions to balance the demand of services, SME needs, and programme resources. 
Accordingly, if we take into account that programme managers could write broad proposals in 
order to access public funds, the breadth of the policy definitions can be exploited by them to 
formalise the discretion of their consultants in each intervention. The data also shows that there 
is the risk that programme workers and auditors could misinterpret the numerous and vague 
phrases of the policies, which probably allowed public interventions to stray even from broad 
policy statements.  
Contributions and Implications 
This research uncovered the duality of roles at street-level in the enterprise innovation policy 
arena. Although discretion is necessary, we consider excessive the discretion exerted by the 
university personnel in the case studies. Policy implementers took the role of policy-makers as a 
result of political interests at the highest levels of government, inappropriate evaluation 
mechanisms, lack of knowledge, intriguing collaboration of the policy administrators, as well as 
broad and ambiguous policies. These findings represent relevant and novel contributions for the 
triple helix model. In general, the issue of discretion was not researched before in the context of 
innovation policy. The origin of discretion seems to be rooted in the political decisions taken at 
the highest levels of government. For this reason, we recommend to study policy-making for 
SME innovation using the political economy framework. In addition, given the deficient support 
and excessive discretion in programmes, we conclude highlighting the need to research the 
entire context that direct programme workers towards objectives that are far from society goals 
(e.g. power over SMEs, demand for programme services, worker alienation, etc.). 
 
Keywords: triple helix, spheres roles, policy implementation discretion, information systems 
innovation, SMEs. 
 
Introduction 
SMEs are underperforming corporations in the adoption of innovations, for example in the IS 
field (e.g. UNCTAD 2009 and EC 2010). Governments have been trying to focus on this 
concern with a series of policies (e.g. EC 2005 and ECLAC 2008). One case is the increasing 
public funding for the support delivered by universities to SMEs in the United Kingdom (Lambert 
2003 and Sainsbury 2007), which represents a clear example of university-industry-government 
interaction. The triple helix model considers the university-industry-government relationships as 
one of relatively equal and interdependent institutional spheres, which can overlap and take the 
roles of the others (e.g. Etzkowitz 2002 and 2008). We illustrate here the case of universities 
taking the role of governments in the field of enterprise innovation. We argue that universities 
should play the role of implementing policies, not making it, and use discretion to some extent 
according to the programmes’ scope of action, which was contractually agreed with the policy 
administrators. 
We define the scope of action as what programme organisations are supposed to do in the 
implementation of particular programmes. In general, programmes have to address aspects of 
the policy frameworks, for example specific IS policies, priority sectors, and cross-cutting 
themes such as the environment or gender of the Regional Economic Strategies of England. In 
addition, programmes have to meet the application criteria of the funds they use, for example 
geographical areas with structural difficulties for the European Regional Development Fund or 
outreach activities of universities for the Higher Education Innovation Fund of England. Finally, 
the programme organisations themselves define with more precision some aspects that 
differentiate each of them when competing to obtain funding, for example services, subject 
areas, delivery methods and technology, target clients, and third-party providers. 
To our knowledge, there is no research about universities taking the role of governments. On 
the contrary, in the fields of public administration and political sciences, there is a long-lasting 
debate between two positions regarding discretion and its effect on policy. First, we have the 
view from those who argue that discretion exists at street-level (e.g. Argyris 1964, Lipsky 1980, 
Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, Ellis et al. 1999, Long 1999, and Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003). In this situation, policies tend to be made as much from policy implementers, 
as from policy-makers. The second position on discretion is from those who propose that there 
has been a shift in power in favour of policy-makers as a result of the centralisation of strategic 
political direction and the introduction of competition in the delivery of public services. (e.g. 
Howe 1991, Clarke and Newman 1997, Hadley and Clough 1997, Lymbery 1998, Jones 1999, 
and Langan 2000). The objectives of this study are to determine if discretion is present in 
programmes, the extent of this practice, the underlying causes for this, as well as a future 
research agenda related to the topic. 
After the introduction, we review in detail the literature about the two positions regarding 
discretion in the delivery of policies. Then, we explain the methodology of the research and 
present the information of six case studies. After this, we analyse the cases in order to 
determine if there was discretion and the extent that it was exerted. Then, we analyse the 
context that influence discretion. We conclude suggesting a research agenda to try to overcome 
the problem of excessive discretion.   
 
Literature Review 
There are two strands of literature that diverge in how they understand the phenomenon of 
discretion in public services (Evans and Harris 2004). Firstly, we have the view of the defenders 
of the existence of discretion for street-level workers (e.g. Argyris 1964, Lipsky 1980, Lindblom 
and Woodhouse 1993, Ellis et al. 1999, Long 1999, and Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). 
For them, policy intervention is an ‘on-going, socially constructed, and negotiated process, not 
simply the execution of an already-specified plan of action with expected outcomes’ (Long 1999 
p. 4). Their initial argument is that discretion is necessary because the work at street-level 
focuses on specialised areas (e.g. Reiss 1971), and requires individual responses which are 
based on observation and judgment (e.g. Wilson 1967).  For example, a programme consultant 
uses discretion in selecting an SME and designing the services to be delivered based on the 
specific characteristics of the IS, the SME, the SME decision-taker, and the SME business 
environment. Also, street-level bureaucrats tend to have interests and opinions that do not 
agree with agency policies or with a management desire to curtail discretion, so there normally 
is a level of conflict and non-compliance with higher levels in the policy context (Van Meter and 
Van Horn 1975 and Prottas 1979). This situation stresses even more the importance of 
discretion. 
For example, one characteristic in the context of bureaucracies is that they often have to deal 
with large amounts of work with insufficient resources (e.g. MacDonald 1990 and Lewis and 
Glennester 1996). As the focus of street-level workers is oriented to client-processing, they 
create shortcuts and simplifications in order to cope with the exigencies of the job (e.g. 
Boradhurst et al. 2009 and Wastell et al. 2009). These coping mechanisms are not necessarily 
consistent with the agency policies but are essential to maintain the programme organisation 
(e.g. Argyris 1964). As the focus of managers are based on aggregated delivery and cost 
efficiency, they do not sanction the simplifications developed by street-level workers (e.g. 
Argyris 1964). Thus it could be concluded that there is simultaneously an inherent conflict as 
well as a mutually dependent relationship between street-level workers and managers. 
To complicate things, the complex nature of the work at street-level makes control of discretion 
a serious problem. Because of this, it is hard to envisage that the proliferation of policies and 
rules could reduce the bureaucratic tasks to programmable formats. Even the attempts of using 
standardised electronic workflows have proven to be risky for the quality of the services 
(Broadhurst et al. 2009 and Wastell et al. 2009). In many cases, policies and rules could be so 
numerous and ambiguous that they could only be applied selectively (e.g. Wilson 1968 and 
Perry and Sornoff 1972). Furthermore, some studies suggest that some policies and rules, 
including evaluation mechanisms, are defined intentionally broad and vague by politicians in 
order to protect their own interests, leaving the responsibility to the experienced bureaucrats to 
interpret and implement them (Moyniham 1969, Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, Wells 1997, 
Harrison 1998, and Ellis et al. 1999). So, street-level bureaucrats may make use of existing 
regulations or legal loopholes to circumvent evaluations, according to their objectives (e.g. 
Prottas 1979). 
In general terms, by way of comparison with lower-level workers in other kinds of organisation, 
street-level bureaucrats enjoy a great level of discretion in defining the nature, amount, and 
quality of their jobs (e.g. Argyris 1964). In this situation, policies tend to be made as much from 
the street-level by public workers, as from the heads of policy agencies (e.g., Argyris 1964, 
Lipsky 1980, Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, Juma and Clarke 1995, Ellis et al. 1999, Long 
1999, and Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). For these reasons, Lindblom and Woodhouse 
(1993 p. 11) said that policy-making is a ‘complex interactive process without beginning or end’.  
On the other hand, we have the view of the advocates of a shift in the distribution of power in 
favour of policy-makers and managers over bureaucrats. They are the new managerialism 
(NMG) proponents (e.g. Howe 1991, Clarke and Newman 1997, Hadley and Clough 1997, 
Lymbery 1998, Jones 1999, and Langan 2000). According to the NMG, this shift has occurred 
as a consequence of the centralisation of strategic political direction and the inclusion of 
competition in the delivery of public services. This challenging structure had generated an 
important cultural change in terms of management responsibilities and supervision. 
The NMG defenders argue that due to this market-oriented scheme the fundamental drivers of 
the public service activity are the managerial commands, the public policies and procedures, the 
evaluative indicators, the allocation of resources, as well as the statutes and legislation that 
create both agencies and clients. Therefore, the practice at street-level is aligned with a context 
of managerial, political, and legal authority. Howe (1991) argues that certain level of discretion 
is allowed in the specific cases of services that demand the use of judgement in each 
intervention or for areas that are not political or managerial priorities. In these cases, there is 
allowance for street-level workers to apply their personal styles or manners of work. However, if 
the beneficiaries of the services started to show behaviours that represented a threat for the 
agency, for example demanding too much use of resources, these areas would become 
priorities and the allowances would disappear. 
 
Methodology 
We used a structure of six case studies of programme assistance to IS innovation initiatives of 
English SMEs. The analysis was deductive and based on the pattern matching analytical 
method (Trochim 1989). We also used replication (Yin 2009), which considered the 
confrontation of rival explanations of case studies with known outcomes. Given the analysis, we 
discarded the reductionist stance because we found excessive discretion in almost all the 
cases. For this part of the research we used semi-structured interviews with the SME decision-
takers and with the programme consultants, as well as read diverse documents such as the 
contracts between the programme organisations and the funding bodies, the proposals of the 
programmes to the SMEs, and programme assistance files. After that, we went in detail into the 
contextual information with the aim of understanding the underlying causes that fostered 
excessive discretion. For this part of the research we gathered further data using semi-
structured interviews with programme managers of different programmes and with ex e-
business policy managers of regions, as well as reading diverse material such as economic 
policy documents and manuals for the management of policies and public funds.  
 
Case Studies 
To begin, table 1 shows the six SMEs assisted and their IS innovation initiatives. In addition, we 
present in table 2 the information of the results of the case studies, basically the contrast 
between the scopes of action agreed with the policy administrators and the services actually 
delivered by the programmes. This is the information required to decide if there was, or was not, 
discretion and to what extent it was exerted. The programmes were run between the beginning 
of 2002 and the end of 2006. We use pseudonyms to identify the programme organisations, 
programmes, and SMEs that participated in the research.  
 
SME Assisted SME Activity IS Initiative 
JVentureCo Building supply sector 
reseller 
A start-up third-party e-marketplace 
RecruConstCo Recruitment agency 
for the construction 
sector 
Development of a portal based, password protected, 
self-service application for clients and candidates 
RecruTrainCo Human resource 
services for multiple 
sectors 
Development of an online training forum, 
improvement of the website’s functionality and 
appearance, and development of further intranet 
functionality 
LanguagesCo Intermediary of 
language services 
Development of an intranet application to manage 
the interaction with language service providers and 
clients 
FuelCo Distribution of 
Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas parts for the 
conversion of truck 
diesel engines  
Development of a database to compare 
consumptions of fuel and costs, graphic 
presentations, and commercialisation of the 
aggregated data of consumptions and costs of the 
fleets. 
ConstCo Project management 
in the construction 
sector 
Improvement of the integrated work of the IT 
platforms and of the informational website 
Table 1. SMEs and IS Initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SME Assisted Public 
Programme 
Scope of Action Agreed with 
the Policy Administrators 
Services Actually 
Delivered 
JVentureCo PP-ELearning Integrated learning via 
coaching, mentoring, and 
training in different business 
subjects, based on e-learning 
techniques and face-to-face 
interaction 
Marketing and web 
design consultancy 
RecruConstCo PP-MultiServe Support via coaching, 
consultancy, mentoring, and 
training in different business 
subjects 
Coaching in strategy 
and marketing 
consultancy 
RecruTrainCo PP-Marketing Marketing support, basically 
consultancy 
Marketing and IS 
services 
LanguagesCo PP-ICTServe High level knowledge transfer 
from the academics of the 
departments of Computing and 
Communications to ICT SMEs 
Traditional IS services 
to generic SMEs 
FuelCo PP-ICTServe High level knowledge transfer 
from the academics of the 
departments of Computing and 
Communications to ICT SMEs 
Traditional IS services 
to generic SMEs using 
third-party service 
providers 
ConstCo PP-ICTServe High level knowledge transfer 
from the academics of the 
departments of Computing and 
Communications to ICT SMEs 
Traditional IT and 
systems services to 
generic SMEs using 
third-party service 
providers 
Table 2. Agreed Scope of Action versus Services Actually Delivered 
 
The public programmes PP-ELearning, PP-MultiServe, and PP-Marketing were run by the 
programme organisation MNGTASSIST and the public programme PP-ICTServe was run by the 
programme organisation ICTASSIST. Both programme organisations are special units of 
universities. These programme organisations have been running public programmes using 
different funding streams, basically the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the 
Regional Development Agency Fund (RDAF), and the Higher Education Innovation Fund 
(HEIF). Specifically, the ERDF is funded by the Directorate-General Regional Policy, the RDAF 
is funded by the HM Treasury, and the HEIF is funded by the Higher Education Funding Council 
for England. 
When programme organisations apply for public funds, they must indicate the public policies 
that they intend to implement. Basically, these policies are stated in the Single Programming 
Documents for the ERDF, in the Regional Economic Strategies for the RDAF, and in the 
policies oriented to the interaction of higher education institutions and industry of the 
Department for Education and Skills for the HEIF. Programmes also have to address the 
application criteria of the funds they plan to use, for instance to apply the funds in regions with 
structural difficulties for the ERDF. Finally, programmes differentiate themselves defining certain 
characteristics of their services such as subject areas, delivery methods and technology, target 
clients, and third-party providers. As mentioned, the aspects addressed of the policy 
frameworks, the application criteria of the funding streams, as well as the way that programme 
organisations differentiate their services define the scope of action of the programmes.  
Existence and Extent of Discretion 
Although the literature on the curtailment of discretion states that good managerial commands, 
public policies and procedures, evaluative indicators, allocation of resources, as well as statutes 
and legislation that create both agencies and clients are effectively reducing discretion at street-
level, Howe (1991) identified two exceptions to this rule. First, he admitted that there are certain 
jobs that cannot be standardised because they demand the use of judgement in each 
intervention, for instance counselling. Second, certain areas are not political or managerial 
priorities. In these cases, there is allowance for street-level workers to apply their personal 
styles or manners of work. As most of the case studies in this research illustrate discretion, 
namely JVentureCo, RecruTrainCo, LanguagesCo, FuelCo, and ConstCo, we will comment on 
the two exceptions to the rule. 
From table 2, in the column called Scope of Action Agreed with the Policy Administrators, we 
can say that all the public programmes were initially designed with services that required a great 
deal of judgement in each intervention. For all the programmes, judgement was needed to 
select SMEs, to design personalised services, to deliver the services, to connect the SMEs with 
other providers, as well as to follow-up on the SMEs’ initiatives. Acknowledging Howe’s position, 
we could say that the street-level workers in this thesis should have had license to use 
discretion given the high level of judgement inherent to their programme services.  
The other option is to consider that the programmes, and the public policies that they 
addressed, were not political or managerial priorities. According to what we exposed in the 
introduction, we do not believe that this was the case but we will consider this possibility in order 
to cover an alternative explanation. Under this assumption, street-level workers could have 
enjoyed a degree of discretion to accommodate only their styles or manners of work. 
However, neither the need for judgement nor the lack of political or managerial priority explains 
the radical departure from the scope of action of the programmes in these case studies. As 
shown in table 2, a great mismatch between the scopes of action and the implementations was 
present in the 5 cases in which discretion was exercised. For example, we believe that the 
decision of the programme workers to change the services in the assistance to LanguagesCo 
from ‘high level knowledge transfer from the academics of the Computing and Communications 
departments to ICT SMEs’ to ‘traditional IS services given to a generic SME’ exceeded the 
judgement that street-level workers should have to act according to the particular situation of 
the SMEs. Similarly, to change the services in the assistance to JVentureCo from ‘integrated 
learning using e-learning techniques and face-to-face interaction’ to ‘consultancy in marketing 
and web design’ was far beyond the discretion needed to incorporate a particular style or 
manner of work.        
We think that the judgement used went further than the numerous actions that could be allowed 
within the scope of action of the programmes. In the same way, the changes observed in the 
programme scopes of action were more than just mere styles or manners of work. We agree 
that discretion at street-level is an important component for the implementation of programmes 
oriented to SME innovation, but this discretion should be relative, should have boundaries, and 
should respect the broad contractual requirements that were previously agreed with the policy 
administrators. In fact, street-level workers were making policy in a broad sense and to a 
greater degree than was accounted for by Howe (1991).  
In the next section we analyse a more comprehensive view of discretion, including the desire 
and possibility of controlling it with conventional methods. In fact, we build an elaborated 
argument that explains the existence of excessive discretion in the public support to SME 
innovation.    
Context for Discretion 
We illustrate here the dependency of policy-makers and programme managers on the exercise 
of discretion in the work with clients. The root causes for this are the political intents at highest 
levels of government. This makes policy-makers, programme administrators, and programme 
managers take decisions that encourage the practice of excessive discretion. The scheme of 
the analysis is shown in figure XX. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure XX. Contextual Influence on Discretion 
 
Political Interests 
The first part of our argument is to consider the policy-making focus regarding public services. 
Most of the time, especially in periods of financial or fiscal crisis, there is pressure to deliver a 
high quantity of services but being very efficient in the use of resources (e.g. MacDonald 1990 
and Lewis and Glennester 1996). In fact, this occurred with the programmes of MNGTASSIST 
and ICTASSIST. The programme managers of both organisations stated that they had very high 
targets and insufficient resources to meet this challenge. This political priority could mean that 
the quality and content of services are secondary considerations. After all, resources are limited 
and it is difficult to control all aspects of the implementation of public policies. A direct 
consequence is that both evaluation and auditing activities tend to focus on the areas that are 
politically relevant. Lipsky (1980 p. 45 and 164, respectively) explained it in this way: 
“Street-Level bureaucracies are under continuous pressure to realise the public 
objectives of efficiency and cost effectiveness. Pressures will be more or less explicitly 
articulated depending upon the political climate and a variety of other factors.” 
“Supervision of subordinates with broad discretion and responsibilities requires assertions 
of priorities in attempting to increase accountability … If everything is scrutinised, nothing 
is scrutinised. Thus efforts to control street-level bureaucrats not only affect those areas 
that are management targets, but they also affect those areas that are not the focus of 
management efforts, since by implication those efforts will not come up for surveillance.” 
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Accordingly, the evaluation mechanisms of the ERDF considered as outputs the number of 
companies assisted, the increase and safeguarding of sales, and the increase and safeguarding 
of jobs. The RDAF and HEIF used only the number of companies assisted. The statements 
relating to sales and jobs do little to inform if the services were needed, if the time dedicated to 
the assistance was enough, if the consulting methodology was appropriate, if the client could 
have benefited from more services, if the client was connected with other providers, if there was 
follow-up to the adoption process of the client, or if there were changes in the competitive 
environment that could have caused variations in sales and jobs. What is more, our assessment 
of the public interventions was very negative in these respects, which confirms the 
inappropriateness of the formal evaluations. Also, all the funding schemes employed exigent 
financial controls. All these formal indicators represented only quantitative, inappropriate, and 
overly complacent views of programme services and their effectiveness. 
We did not identify any meaningful qualitative feedback in the formal evaluations done for the 
funding bodies. Only the RDAF and the HEIF programmes needed conformity letters from the 
clients stating the degree of satisfaction with the services. However, there was not any 
evaluation tool mandated by the funding bodies that informed what actually happened in the 
assistance and adoption processes, which left an open door for discretion.  
Bottom-Up Collaboration 
Also, we could infer that the political priorities were supported by the auditing work and the 
external control of the programmes, which were done by policy administrators. As happened 
with the outputs, the auditors did not question other aspects of the scope of action of the 
programmes, basically the eligibility of SMEs, types of services, and delivery mechanisms. 
Accordingly, the opinion of an ex e-business policy manager of a region was that the auditing 
activities for the funding bodies were carried out by contract managers who normally ‘do not 
care about business and technology’. He added that the auditors scrutinised in detail only the 
existence of output and financial documents. The programme manager of ICTASSIST 
expressed a similar opinion in relation to the auditing focus on outputs and finances. She said 
that ‘as long as the auditors see that you provide an assistance that is relevant and they see 
that you are hitting the targets and spending the budget correctly, it isn’t necessarily an issue if 
it doesn’t follow to the words that you said you were doing in the bid’. 
In most cases, the funding bodies commissioned the management of the deployment of funds 
to organisations that took important roles in designing the public policies or that were connected 
to the programme organisations. To be more precise, the policy administrators had conflict of 
interests regarding the policies and programmes that they were judging. The occurrence of this 
type of conflict is criticised by Storey (2006). 
For instance, the Government Offices for the English Regions led the development of the Single 
Programming Documents. However, the Secretariats, which were created by and depended on 
the Government Offices, were in charge of the auditing and control of the European Union 
funded programmes. Other case is when the day-to-day management of various parts of the 
implementation is assigned to a different type of policy administrator. This is done by linking 
related parts of a Single Programming Documents, with the aim of improving coordination and 
maximising impact in critical geographical areas, socio-economic groups, or across different 
themes. This integration is known as Action Plans. For the implementations of Action Plans, the 
political accountable body in the northwest was the Regional Development Agency, which 
actively participated in the partnership which designed, drafted, and approved the Single 
Programming Document. What is more, in the north-west of England the operative tasks of the 
Action Plan related to knowledge transfer initiatives were charged to the Northwest Universities 
Association. Taking into account that the members of these associations are universities, we 
can say that universities were auditing and controlling the programmes that they were delivering 
themselves. 
Similarly, the Regional Development Agencies had the political leadership in the development of 
the Regional Economic Strategies. However, they directly audited and controlled the RDAF 
programmes. The situation of the Higher Education Funding Council for England was a special 
case because they did not participate in the policy-making process. They are an independent 
non-departmental public body, which only deploys and controls funds. The public policies 
concerning the outreach activities of higher education institutions were defined by the 
Department for Education and Skills. Also, the use of the HEIF was deliberately open and 
largely dependent on the higher education institutions themselves. Practically all types of 
services, areas of support, delivery methods, companies, and geographical areas were eligible. 
 
Broad and Ambiguous Policies 
Discretion could also be facilitated from top to bottom in the policy context if we consider that 
some policy statements are very broad and vague in nature. With this, politicians and 
programme managers permit street-level workers a big room to judge in situ and define their 
interventions for each case.  Accordingly, this could be a direct consequence of poorly-defined 
goals at highest levels of governance (e.g. Moyniham 1969, Landau 1973, and Hasenfeld and 
English 1974). Also, policy-makers could use extensive and ambiguous policies as a strategy in 
order to distance themselves from the consequences of the individual and complicated 
decisions to balance demand, needs, and resources (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, Wells 
1997, Harrison 1998, and Ellis et al. 1999).  These authors also found similarities in the low 
level of scrutiny done by policy-makers and programme managers. 
One example of the manifestation of policy broadness can be observed in the initial policy 
statement of the Single Programming Document that was addressed by the programme 
organisation ICTASSIST, in order to access the ERDF funds for its public programme PP-
ICTServe (Government Office for the North West 2001 p. 232):  
“This measure aims to enhance the region’s competitive position by supporting innovation 
activities, especially those linked to advanced R&D and knowledge transfer initiatives, 
through the development of innovative business networks. Actions will support new 
innovation partnerships and the development of both horizontal networks and the 
facilitation and linking together of business networks to create innovations, share 
knowledge, and pool resources.” 
From this paragraph, we infer that it is a short but very broad statement regarding sophisticated 
innovations and inter-organisational networks. However, after reading the complementary 
information (Government Office for the North West 2001 p. 243-245) we found that the 
expansion of this statement into three pages extended even more the breadth of the policy, 
instead of making it more concise. We found indicative actions and fields of intervention as 
diverse as, ‘SME links with the higher education sector’, ‘development of advanced e-commerce 
solutions’, ‘gateway/portal internet/websites’, ‘innovative services and applications provided by 
advanced digital networks’, ‘technology management projects’, ‘encouragement of access to 
and use of e-commerce SMEs in the e-economy’, ‘business advisory services’, ‘research 
projects based in universities and research institutes’, and ‘innovation and technology transfer’. 
As a consequence, the breadth of a policy definition can be exploited by programme 
organisations to formalise discretion if we take into account that they could write broad 
proposals in order to access public funds. A programme consultant of ICTASSIST mentioned 
that they develop ‘big proposals’ to access public funds. The same person said that ‘you get an 
amount of money and then you do what you want’. Similarly, the programme manager of 
MNGTASSIST expressed that they wrote some of their proposals in an open way in terms of the 
scope of action of the programmes, in order to have freedom to define the interventions for each 
SME. They call these proposals sent to policy administrators ‘permissive bids’ and the services 
delivered to SMEs ‘demand-led services’. 
In this thesis, only the assistance of PP-MultiServe to RecruConstCo did not show discretion. 
However, just this programme was the only one that was very open in the scope of action 
agreed with the policy administrators, i.e. the Regional Development Agency and the Northwest 
Universities Association. Basically, the scope of action included support in different business 
subjects such as strategy, marketing, and web presence, using different methods such as 
coaching, consultancy, mentoring, and training. Accordingly, the assistance to RecruConstCo 
was for a coaching in strategy and a marketing consultancy.   
Finally, it is not only the license to address a broad policy statement in innumerable ways, but 
also the risk that programme workers and auditors could misinterpret the numerous and vague 
phrases of the policies, which could allow public interventions to stray even from broad policy 
statements (Handler 1973, Scott 1990, Lewis and Glennerster 1996, and Evans and Harris 
2004). Evans and Harris (2004 p. 885 and 886, respectively) explained it as follows: 
“There are many examples of worker activity interpreting and using rules, and of the 
failures and confusions of top-down control … Rules, even though we often think of them 
as unambiguous, can contribute to the uncertainty that creates discretion.” 
“Different but equally valid interpretations of policy could be made by drawing on elements 
in the same body of knowledge, with these elements being outlined, emphasised, or 
downplayed in different ways by different interpreters … Even if the author takes for 
granted a certain context of interpretation, the audiences do not necessarily share it.” 
The misinterpretation of policy could have happened in the three interventions of PP-ICTServe. 
For example, we consider that the report about the IT platforms and the improvement of the 
website for ConstCo, shown in table 2, completely mismatch with the core policy statement 
related to ‘sophisticated innovations and inter-organisational networks’, but for the programme 
workers and auditors it could have been connected with phrases such as ‘SME links with the 
higher education sector’, ‘development of advanced e-commerce solutions’, ‘gateway/portal 
internet/websites’, or ‘technology management projects’. Similarly, we do not see much 
connection between the same core policy statement and the development of the intranet 
application to manage the interaction with language service providers and clients for 
LanguagesCo, or the development of the database to compare fuel consumption data of 
prospective clients of FuelCo. All these works were only time consuming, and did not require 
research and development. Also, they were assigned only to one or two individuals, and not to a 
network of organisations. 
 
Conclusions 
This study exposed the duality of roles at street-level in the enterprise innovation policy field. 
Even though discretion is necessary, we regard as excessive the discretion practised by the 
university personnel in the case studies. Programme workers took the role of policy-makers as a 
consequence of political interests at the highest levels of government, inappropriate evaluation 
mechanisms, poor goals, intriguing collaboration of the policy administrators, as well as broad 
and ambiguous policies. These findings represent important and original contributions for the 
triple helix model. In general, the topic of discretion was practically not studied before in the 
context of enterprise innovation policy. As the origin of discretion seems to be embedded in the 
political decisions made at the highest levels of governance, we suggest studying policy-making 
for enterprise innovation using the political economy framework, especially for SMEs. In 
addition, given the deficient assistance and excessive discretion, we conclude emphasising the 
need to study the entire context that influence programme workers towards objectives that are 
distant from society goals, e.g. inadequate evaluation mechanisms, power over SMEs, low 
access to resources, demand for programme services, and worker alienation (Lipsky 1980). 
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